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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______
No. 10-4229
______
JOHN BLANK,
Appellant
v.
THE PENNSYLVANIA SOCIETY FOR THE
PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS;
HOWARD NELSON, in his official and
individual capacity; GEORGE BENGAL, in
his official and individual capacity; ASHLEY
MUTCH, in her official and individual capacity;
JUAN MARTINEZ, in his official and individual
capacity; MAIN LINE ANIMAL RESCUE, INC;
WILLIAM SMITH
______
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-03222)
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle III
______
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
June 24, 2011
Before: BARRY, AMBRO, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 28, 2011)
______
OPINION OF THE COURT
______

VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.
I.
John Blank appeals from the District Court’s order granting the Defendants’
motion to dismiss his federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and accompanying state law
claims. Blank argues that the District Court erred in concluding that: (1) his federal
claims against the Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and
several of its employees were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); and (2)
Main Line Animal Rescue (“MLAR”) and its CEO and president William Smith were not
acting under the color of state law. We will affirm.
II.1
We write only for the parties and assume their familiarity with the factual and
procedural history of this case, which is set forth in the District Court’s opinion. See
Blank v. Pa. Soc’y for the Prev. of Cruelty to Anim., et al., No. 2:10-cv-03222, 2010 WL
3927590, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2010). We have little to add to the District Court’s
reasoning, as explained in Judge Bartle’s opinion, for granting the motion to dismiss as to
the same issues raised on appeal. Thus we will limit our discussion to one aspect of the
District Court’s opinion and otherwise affirm for substantially the same reasons
expressed therein.
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The District Court had jurisdiction over Blank’s § 1983 action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3)-(4), and 1367. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291. We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229
(3d Cir. 2010).
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Although we agree with the District Court that Blank’s federal claims constitute an
impermissible collateral attack on his convictions, see Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, we part
ways with the District Court on one particular point. The District Court concluded that
the “Commonwealth’s entire case hinged on the evidence of animal cruelty obtained
through the July 17, 2008 raid.” Blank, 2010 WL 3927590, at *3. Because several
Defendants visited Blank’s kennel prior to the July 17, 2008 raid and witnessed poor
living conditions and animal injuries, we cannot say with confidence that his convictions
were based exclusively on evidence obtained from the purportedly illegal search and
seizure that took place on July 17, 2008.
Nonetheless, we think Blank’s federal claims are barred by Heck because they are
premised on the theory that this additional evidence was “concoct[ed],” “distorted,” and
“misrepresented” as part of a broad conspiracy to conduct an illegal search and seizure
and deprive Blank of his constitutional rights. (App. at 28-30.) Elsewhere in his
complaint, Blank contends that the conduct of several Defendants resulted in “the
continued filing and prosecution of charges and cases that should never have been filed
and prosecuted.” (Id. at 42.) In sum, Blank’s federal claims are contingent on the
proposition that genuine evidence of the crimes to which he pled guilty did not exist and
that no investigation or charges would have been brought against him but for a deliberate
conspiracy carried out by the Defendants. Accordingly, Blank’s claims are irreconcilable
with his guilty plea, and if successful, they would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
convictions. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Thus, while we differ with the District Court
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regarding the significance of the July 17, 2008 raid, we agree with the District Court’s
ultimate conclusion that Blank’s federal claims are barred by Heck.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court granting
the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
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